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Appellate Court No.
930160-CA

vs.
SONJA SWANSON
Defendant and Appellant

Comes

now

R.

Clayton

Huntsman,

counsel

for

defendant-

appellant, and files the following Errata sheet correcting errors
in Brief of Appellant (hereafter "Brief") filed December 20, 1993.
1.

On

p. 4 of Brief,

under

"E".

PUBLISHED

ETHICAL

OPINIONS. . . .": Opinion 34 is cited on page 23 in Brief, as well as
attached in Addendum.
2.

On p. 35, there should be a comma after "underpayment."

Also "Kalkaesque" (sic) should be "Kafkaesque."

l

3.

On p. 43 "rape" should be "abuse."

Respectfully submitted this

day

of

1993.

R. CI^TOl^HUNTSl
Attornei^ror Defendant
AppeLtant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY

and

j? LING

I do hereby certify that on the ^f
day of December, 1993,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ERRATA
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:
Jan Graham
Utah State Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

R. CLAY^DN HUNTSMAN
AttorHley for Defendant
Appellant
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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT;
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence entered

in a state district court in Utah.

Accordingly, the Utah Court of

Appeal has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2 ((f) ) .
However, because of the nature of this case, and the broad
scope of remedy sought, and for other good cause, Appellant has
respectfully suggested that the Utah Court of Appeals may desire to
certify this case to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to U.C.A.
4

§78-2a-3(3), as amended.
V.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH AUTHORITY.
A.
1.
counsel

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Whether defendant's right to the undivided loyalty of
was

relationship

jeopardized
as

"of

because

counsel"

and

of

her

appointed

"office

sharing"

counsel's
with,

and

functional integration into, a lawfirm, both in fact and as held
out to the public, when that lawfirm prosecutes city cases in Utah,
defends criminal cases in Utah, and has a senior partner who is a
county commissioner with powers over both defendant's prosecutor as
well

that

same

partner's

"of

counsel"

lawfirm

member,

i.e.

defendant's appointed attorney who is on contract with that same
county as public defender.
2.

Whether defendant In fact received ineffective assistance

of counsel in not being allowed to possess or even read her own
discovery after several requests, in being "rushed through" the
local criminal justice system without being allowed participation
herself, and/or in being told to plead guilty straight-up to a
second-degree felony by her appointed legal counsel while she was
in an overcrowded jail sleeping on the floor next to a common
toilet,

if

she

wanted

to

be

released,

and

whether

this

action/inaction constitutes ineffective representation of counsel,
5

and if so,
(a)

does it provide grounds for reversal of conviction and

sentence, either independently or taken together with the
other Brown-related conflict of interest issues raised here,
and
(b)

whether per se reversal is even appropriate, given the

hostile and interconflicting system of criminal justice in
Washington County, and whether a final judgment of dismissal
with prejudice by the appellate court might not be a more
appropriate and just remedy than reversal and remand.
3.

Whether defendant or anyone else should rely solely on

unpaid volunteer

activist

legal counsel to represent her when

Washington County has a statutory duty to assure the undivided
loyalty of defense counsel for the indigent, and which counsel
Washington County has refused to provide, and if Washington has
refused to provide undivided loyalty of defense counsel, forcing
indigent defendants to find other counsel,
(a)

whether

all

citizens

similarly

situated

should

be

entitled to automatic reversal or dismissal with prejudice or
some other remedy as a class, since Washington County and its
agents were well aware of the per-se reversal warnings in
Brown several months ago and refused to comply, requiring
wronged defendants to undergo even further injustice, and
6

(b)

Whether as a matter of public policy, to deter similar

conduct and/or to remedy defendant's position, Washington
County and or the State of Utah, which forced this indigent
defendant in a felony case to obtain loyal counsel when the
county flatly refused to do so even after notice in Brown,
supra,

should

not be ordered

to pay

appellant's

counsel

attorneys fees for his representation of her in this case.
4. Whether the following general order, or one similar to it,
from the Utah Supreme Court under its inherent supervisory powers,
should be promulgated now to provide proper guidance to courts and
counsel, and to further the ends of justice; that general order
reading as follows, or substantially similar thereto:
(a)

"An attorney who is employed by or on contract with any

state government or agency or subdivision thereof, or holding
any elective or appointed office, whether paid or unpaid, in
any state government or subdivision thereof, in any capacity,
shall not defend any person accused of a crime, particularly
the indigent, who have no choice in the selection of their
legal counsel", and
(b)

"What an attorney cannot do, neither can that attorney's

partner, associate,
"tenant",

"of counsel" designee, office-sharer,

"landlord" or anyone else associated

with

that

attorney in a way which presents any conflict of interest,
7

however

slight, whether

potential

or

actual, or

even

in

appearance, in assuring the undivided loyalty to one accused
of a crime".
5.

In light of the difficulty this defendant will have in

receiving a fair trial and due process and in light of the refusal
of the criminal justice system in Washington County to act in good
faith to date to correct itself, even well after notice of State v.
Brown, supra, whether the appropriate remedy on appeal should be
dismissal of all criminal charges with prejudice and on the merits,
rather than remand for a new trial in a hostile, prejudicial, and
unjust environment.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[For this type of case a simply-

phrased response such as "plain error" does not apply].
All issues above involve claim of 6th and 14th Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel.

According to State v.

Garrett, 207 Utah Adv.Rep 45 (filed in the Utah Ct.App. Feb.
26,

1993),

P.2d.

, defendant must show that trial

counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness" and "that the deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial."

Cited also

are Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064

(1984) and State y^_ Tempi in, 805 P.2d

(Utah 1990).
8

182, 186

Further,

upon

such

claim

the

appellate

court

must

"indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls

within

the

wide

range

of

reasonable

professional

assistance," i.e., "overcome the presumption that under the
circumstances the challenged action [or inaction?] >might be
considered sound trial strategy'."

["or inaction?" added].

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104S.Ct. at 2065 (etc.).
also Tempiin, supra, 805 P.2d. at 186.

See

If defendant can show

"that counsel's actions were NOT conscious trial strategy,"
[emphasis added] then the appellate court can find "deficient
performance."

This Court must be persuaded that defendant's

trial counsel's actions [or inaction] lacked "any conceivable
tactical basis" before reversing on an ineffectiveness claim.
State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989).
This Court must also be persuaded that trial counsel's
deficient

performance,

defendant.

if

any,

actually

prejudiced

the

Defendant must show this Court that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors,

the

result

different.

A

sufficient

to

of

the

proceeding

reasonable

probability

undermine

confidence

would
is
in

a
the

have

been

probability
outcome."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
A record for review was made in the instant case in a
9

lengthy probable cause hearing to stay punishment and sentence
pending appeal.

New counsel is also of record.

However, an additional and perhaps far more significant
and applicable "standard of review" analysis in this most
unusual case is that found in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 at
856-57:
Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power
over the Courts...[we reverse].
Also
standard

Brown.

supra.

at

857

presents

an

even

better

for review of post-Brown cases, where, as here,

counties and prosecutors and defense counsel are and have been
on notice at least since November 30, 1992, and certainly is
applicable in the instant case, which arose January 13, 1993,
well after Brownfs publication:
Because a concrete showing of prejudice would be
very difficult to make when a prosecutor is appointed to
assist in the defense of an accused, we conclude that it
is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, we announce
a per
se rule of reversal whenever
such dual
representation is undertaken so as to prevent its
recurrence. rEmphasis added].
It is this per-se rule that appears clearly designed to
get the attention of those who just don't "get it"—i.e., who
fail to see the connection between the serious underlying
abuse of conflicting interests and the resulting injustice,
whether from conscious or unconscious actions, arising out of
10

those conflicts of interest. This standard of review ought to
be

the

one

applied

on

all

five

issues

raised

here,

particularly Nos. 3, 4, and 5 above, which are intended to
encourage this Court to apply meaningful remedies, to put
"teeth11 in to the per se rule in Brown, and to meaningfully
deter the blatant ignoring or sidestepping of Brown in the
future as well as during the very recent past.

A "bright-

line" rule, or an order granting attorneys fees, and dismissal
with prejudice (rather than reversal and remand to a hostile
justice system) are especially amenable to the powers of the
Utah Supreme Court to regulate courts and attorneys, and
therefore the Brown standard of review, with expansions noted
above, should be the standard applied in all issues raised
above, particularly in 3, 4, and 5

VI.

VERBATIM STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW:
A.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

1.

UNITED STATES CONST, amend VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
2.

UNITED STATES CONST, amend X:
11

The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.
3.

UNITED STATES CONST, amend XIV:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
B.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

1.

CONST. OF UTAH Article I §7:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
2.

CONST. OF UTAH Article I §12:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy pubic trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
3.

CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §3:

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme
12

Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters
to be exercised as provided by statute, and the power to issue
all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme
Courtfs jurisdiction or the complete determination of any
cause.
4.

CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §4:

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by
rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in
Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
C.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:

1.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-1 et sea.

The following are minimum standards to be provided by
each county, city and town for the defense of indigent persons
in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative
bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces
the substantial probability of the deprivation of his
liberty;
(2)
Afford timely representation by competent legal
counsel;
(3)
Provide the investigatory and other facilities
necessary for a complete defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the
client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and
prosecuting of other remedies before or after a
conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in
the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
13

2.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-2 et seq

Due to length this section is respectfully reproduced in the
Addendum to this brief, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) and 24(f), Utah
R.App.P., in App. I-A, infra.
3.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-7-5:

Every court has authority to:
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.
4.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-51-30:

An attorney who directly or indirectly advises in
relation to, or aids or promotes the defense of, any action or
proceeding in any court, the prosecution of which is carried
on, aided or promoted by a person as public prosecutor with
whom such attorney is directly or indirectly connected as a
partner, or who, having himself prosecuted or in any manner
aided or promoted any action or proceeding in any court as
public prosecutor, afterwards directly or indirectly advises
in relation to, or takes any part in, the defense thereof as
an attorney or otherwise; or who takes or receives any
valuable consideration from or on behalf of any defendant in
any such action upon any understanding or agreement whatever,
express or implied, relating to the defense thereof, is guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly, and his
license to practice may be revoked or suspended.
5.

UTAH CODE ANN. §17-18-1(9)(a):

A county attorney may not (a) jjn any manner consult,
advise, counsel, or defend within this state any person
charged with a crime, misdemeanor, or breach of any penal
statute or ordinance; [Emphasis added].
6.

UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-4(3)(4)(5):

Improperly disclosing or using private, controlled, or
protected information—Using position to secure privileges or
exemptions—Accepting
employment
which
would
impair
independence of judgment or ethical performance.
14

(3) use or attempt to use his official position to secure
special privileges or exemptions for himself or others;
(4)
accept other employment which he might expect would
impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his
public duties; or
(5)
accept other employment which he might expect would
interfere with the ethical performance of his public duties.
7.

UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-5(1)(a)(b):

(1)
No public officer or public employee shall knowingly
receive, accept, take, seek, or solicit, directly or
indirectly, any gift, compensation, or loan for himself or
another if:
(a) it tends to influence him in the discharge of his
official duties; or
(b) he recently has been, or is now, or in the near
future may be involved in any governmental action
directly affecting the donor or lender, unless a
disclosure of the gift, compensation, or loan and other
relevant information has been made in the manner provided
in Section 67-16-6.
8.

UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-9.
No public officer or public employee shall have personal
investments in any business entity which will create a
substantial conflict between his private interests and his
public duties.
D.
1.

RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 605:
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that
trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to
preserve the point.
2.
(a)

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
Rule 8(a):
A defendant charged with a public offense has the
right to self-representation, and if indigent has the
right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces
a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty.

(b)

Rule 16(a)
15

(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall
disclose to the defense upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1)
relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3)
physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendants;
(4)
evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilty of the accused, mitigate the guilty of
the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment;
(5)
any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made available
to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
(c)

Rule 22

(Copied, in Addendum) I-B, infra.
(d)

Rule 25(a)

In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either put its own
initiative or upon application of either party order an
information or indictment dismissed.
3.
(a)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 43:

(Copied in Addendum)
(b)

Rule 30(b)

If a judgment of conviction is reversed,
shall be held unless otherwise specified by the
judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed
the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall
[Emphasis added].
4.

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-605:
16

a new trial
court. If a
or modified,
be executed.

Unpublished opinions, orders, and judgments have no
precedential value and shall not be cited or used in the
courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
5.
(a)

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.3 Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable
promptness in representing a client.

(b)

diligence

and

Rule 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b)
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
(c)

Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest:

General Rule.

[Copied in Addendum].
(d)

Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification:

General Rule.

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. [Emphasis added].
(e)

2.1.

Advisor.

In representing a client, a lawyer
independent professional judgment....
(f)

shall

exercise

Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused
has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable
17

opportunity to obtain counsel.
(g)
Lawyer.

Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory
(a)
A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when
its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
to take reasonable remedial action.

(h)

Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer.
(a)
A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the
direction of another person.

(i)

Rule 7.2 Advertising.

[Cited in Addendum].
(j)

Rule 7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a
partnership or other organization only when that is the
fact. [Emphasis added].

G.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
Court Below:
18

This is a criminal case.

Defendant-Appellant Sonja Swanson

was arrested in hr own home by five armed policemen pursuant to a
search warrant. Officers claim controlled substances were found in
her home.
Defendant-Appellant Swanson was charged with the second-degree
felony offense of "possession of controlled substances, to wit:
methamphetamines, with intent to distribute,ft
felony.

a second-degree

Swanson was jailed forthwith.

On January

14, 1993, Defendant-Appellant

Swanson

appeared

before Hon. James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court Judge in and for
Washington County, State of Utah.

After an inquiry Judge Shumate

found her indigent and appointed Washington County Public Defender
J. MacArthur Wright to represent her.
On January 19, 1993, Defendant-Appellant allegedly waived her
rights to a preliminary hearing and a bindover order was issued.
Only then was she released from custody at the women ! s tank of the
Washington County Jail1, where she had been held continuously since
*0n November 11, 1993, Washington County settled a class-action
lawsuit with Defendant-Appellant Sonja Swanson as one named
plaintiff. The suit was brought, and settled in plaintiff's favor,
because of unconstitutional overcrowding and other wrongs suffered
by women ordered into the Washington County Jail, including many,
like Ms. Swanson, who had not even been convicted of anything, but
who were only being detained because of indigency or otherwise
unable to meet bail. See, Christina Lynn Stucki and Sonja Swanson,
individually and on behalf of a group for inmates similarly
situated. Plaintiffs, vs. Washington County, a government entity:
Glenwood Humphries, Washington County Sheriff; Jon Neighbor,
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her arrest.

She pleaded guilty, "straight-up," to the second-

degree felony, pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement she entered
into while incarcerated in an illegally over-crowded jail.
On March 3, 1993, Ms, Swanson was sentenced to 60 days jail in
the same illegal facility, with 3 0 days stayed upon her receiving
substance abuse counselling.

Judgment was executed on March 5,

1993.
On March 4, 1993, Defendant-Appellant, through new (present)
counsel, filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause
staying punishment during the appeal.

The Probable Cause hearing

commenced March 5, 1993, continued over several days, and was
granted on March 12, 1993.

It was executed and filed by the trial

court on March 17, 1993.
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 4, 1993.

However, since

judgment was not executed and filed until March 5, 1993, nor ever
copied to Defendant-Appellantfs new counsel, who appeared on March
4, 1993, an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on March 18, 1993,
as soon as new counsel was able to determine whether, when, and
where judgment had been placed.
Docketing statement was filed on April 5, 1993.

Several

Undersheriff; Russell J. Gallian, Washington County Commissioner;
Gayle M. Aldred, Washington County Commissioner; Jerry B. Lewis,
Washington County Commissioner; John Doe I through John Doe X, Case
No. 93-C-527G, United States District Court, District of Utah,
Central Division.
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requests since were made to Washington County to transmit the
entire

record.

After

the

Court

Administrator

was

finally

contacted, seven months after the docketing statement was filed,
the record was apparently transmitted, and briefing notices issued.
H.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 13, 1993, defendant was arrested in her home by
five armed officers pursuant to a search warrant.
15:17-16:2 and March 8 Tr. 62:16-63:14.

March 5 Tr.

She was immediately read

her Miranda (March 8 Tr. 71:25-72:3 and 63:15-25) warning before
she was fully awake and was not allowed to dress.
65:10-18 and 73:3-6; March 5 Tr. 15-19-25.
exposed and terrified.
for her young

She felt vulnerable,

March 8 Tr. 64:12-65-20.

daughter's well being.

March 8 Tr.

March

She was afraid
5 Tr.

17:3 0-19.

Officers claimed to have found a small amount of methamphetamine in
her purse March 5 Tr. 16:1-2 and 22:4-8 which was at Ms. Swanson's
home.

.Id.

She was arrested and the next day, after inquiry, was

found to be indigent.

March 5 Tr. 17:24-18:1.

J. MacArthur

Wright, who has a contract with Washington County to represent the
indigent accused, (March 8 Tr. 9:2-4 and March 8 Tr 33:7-8 and
March 12 Tr. 36: 23-37:2) was appointed to represent her.

Id. and

March 12 Tr. 36:20-22.
J.

MacArthur

Wright

has held

himself

out

to

the

public

variously as an associate or as "of counsel11 with the law firm of
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Gallian, Westfall, and Wilcox (GWW).

See Defendants Exhibit 1,

"Telephone Book", and March 8 Tr. 13:17-15:4.

Mr. Russ Gallian,

senior partner of GWW, has been town attorney for the Town of
Ivins,

Utah,

March

8 Tr.

83:14-16

and

with

John

Hummel, an

associate in GWW, has prosecuted city cases there at all material
times herein.
28:18-29:9

March 8 Tr. 83:22-84:5 and March 12 Tr. 29.1; Tr.

and 49:8-50:14.

The same John Hummel has been on

contract with Kanab City, Utah, as public defender for the indigent
accused since January 1, 1992 to the present.
23.

March 12 Tr. 29:16-

Further, the same Mr. Gallian has been, at all material times

herein, a Washington County Commissioner with budgetary and other
administrative functions and oversight with the Washington County
Attorneys Office,
defender,

(March 8 Tr. 93:19-25; 94:8-25),

(March 8:Tr.91-19-24

Tr:95:l-3),

the

sherifffs

the public

Tr. 85:6-20) the jail

office,

(March

8

Tr.

(March 8

95:2-6)

and

virtually all other aspects of the local criminal justice system.
Id.

Exhibits and testimony showed that Mr. Wright has had his

photograph published in telephone advertising directories with the
partners and associates of GWW, sometimes with a tiny "of counsel"
designation, and sometimes not even that.

Exhibit; March 8 Tr.

13:17-15:4.

Commissioner

Further,

Mr.

Wright

and

Gallian

testified that they share the same telephone number, (March 8 Tr.
95:17)

the

same

office

suite

(with
22

only

the

designation

of

"Gallian, Westfall and Wilcox" on the entrances);
16:7-11

and

confidences;

Tr.

15:5-8)

secretaries

who

(March 8 Tr.

are privy

(March 8 Tr. 9:22-2 5) computers which

to

mutual

interface;

(March 8 Tr. 22:11-13); and in all other material respects share a
unified practice, (March 12 Tr. 39:5-12), including Commissioner
Gallian's collecting a percentage of Mr. Wright's civil fees (March
8 Tr. 97:20-23 and 103: 17-22, and 83:8-13).

Both Commissioner

Gallian and Mr. Wright admitted that their relationship has been,
at all

material times hereto, at least one of office sharing.

March 8 Tr. 96:19-23 and 21:24-22:4

The same district court judge

in an identical post-Brown case ruled that Gallian and Wright had
an "office sharing relationship".
added).

This was before Utah

March 8 Tr. 96:13-15 (Emphasis
State Bar

Counsel

Steve Trost

testified that "office sharing" violated Brown. Testimony of Steve
Trost, Bar Counsel suggested that the designation "of counsel" is
even more proximate to associate or partner status than it is to
"office sharing". March 12 Tr. 19:24-20:2 and March 8 Tr 88:16-22.
Steve Trost, Utah State Bar Counsel, testified as an expert witness
that since State v. Brown (2 01 Utah Adv.Rep.4 Nov. 30, 1992) was
decided under the Utah Supreme Court's inherent supervisory power
over the courts, and since published Opinion 3 4 of the Utah State
Bar and the Code of Professional Ethics are also promulgated in
furtherance thereof, that the Brown policy and rule clearly applies
23

not only to individuals with concurrent prosecutorial and criminal
defense functions but to partners, associates, and those who office
share.

March 12 Tr. 21:3-25:21.

Further, defendant Sonja Swanson testified that her attorney
was too busy to provide effective counsel; (March 8 Tr. 53:8-9);
refused to give her copies of her own alleged confessions or any
other discovery even when requested (March 5 Tr. 19:7-20; March 8
Tr. 44:19-45:5; see also Tr. 58:1-4); and told her

(in effect)

"they've got you—just plead guilty", and then speeded her through
the system.

March 5 Tr. 19:21-24.

Mr. Wright himself testified

under oath that "it was my policy not to give [a police report of
defendant's own statement to them] to
unusual circumstances...."

[the accused] except in

March 8 Tr. 44:19-24 and 45:2-5.

After the initial Notice of Appeal was filed, a Certificate of
Probable Cause hearing was held before the District Court.
5, 8 & 12 Trs. in toto.

March

That court appeared from the beginning to

be antagonistic to defendant and predisposed to view the evidence
wherever possible to avoid the uncomfortable proximity of Brown.
It cross-examined

defendant

sua

sponte

in ways which

counsel

ethically could not, such as asking her if she did not in fact
serve jail time for an unrelated DUI several years before March 8
Tr. 77:5-25.

[Defendant responded admirably that she had, and

that the Washington County jail was as overcrowded then as it is
24

now and that she had to sleep on the floor next to a toilet then as
well as now]•

March 8 Tr. 78:1-5.

The Court at first refused to

take Opinion 34 seriously, saying to defendant's counsel "as you
well know, if it [Opinion 34] is based in 1976, the entire Rules of
Professional Conduct for attorneys were substantially revamped in
the late 1980f s".

March 8 Tr. 25:19-26:18.

But when Mr. Trost

testified that Opinion 34 was indeed current and reliable, the
Court reached to make findings of "fact" which so contradicts and
distorts the evidence presented and even its own previous holding
in a virtually identical unpublished case it cited on the record
that to a reasonable person it appears to be an as an abuse of
discretion [i.e., finding "only a rental arrangement, not office
sharing", March 12 Tr. 38:1-8 despite evidence to the contrary and
admissions to the contrary by even Mr. Wright and Commissioner
Gallian themselves], and a prior ruling in an unpublished case the
court referred to called "Frausto" raising identical issues by the
same Court that the Gallian-Wright relationship was in fact office
sharing.

March 12 Tr. 96:14-15 and March 12 Tr. 19:24-20.2; March

8 Tr. 88:16-22; March 12 Tr 42:14-43:3.

The court even suggested

it evaded a consistent holding of "office sharing" in the instant
case because of Mr. Trostfs clear testimony that "office sharing"
was a conflict of interest.

March 12 Tr. 44:6-10.

The Court also

referred to its own office sharing—rental—situation
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in years

past—an irrelevant and defendant believes improper, biased, and
personal insertion into the case, particularly in combination with
abuse of discretion in findings and in proceedings elsewhere on
several occasions.

March 12 Tr. 43:4-22.

The Court's conduct is

relevant in this fact statement because the remedy sought on appeal
takes into account the difficulty of the Washington County justice
system, as now constituted, to provide a fair trial or meaningful
due process upon reversal and remand, because of an inability of
key elements in that system to objectively recognize the tangled
conflicts
locally.

of

interest,

and

the

resulting

injustice,

existing

This is especially so even after the Brown decision was

published on November 30, 1992.

Also, due to an inextricable,

easily correctable, but stubbornly maintained web of conflicts of
interest, in fact as well as in the chilling appearances thereof,
even a reversal and remand would not provide defendant substantial
justice under the circumstances.

I.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

1.

Defendant-Appellant was denied her right to the undivided

loyalty of counsel because her court-appointed public defender was
an associate of, or was "of counsel" to, or at least

"office

shared" with, and was functionally integrated into a lawfirm which
simultaneously prosecuted criminal cases in Utah and whose senior
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partner is a county commissioner whose senior partner is a county
commissioner

(one of three) with

powers

the

over

public

supervisory

defender

himself,

and/or
over

budgetary

defendant's

prosecutor over her jail, over the sheriff's office, and virtually
every

other

aspect

of

the Washington

County

system, and who, under contract, shared

criminal

fees with

justice

defendant's

court-appointed public defender.
The

other

two

public

defenders

did

not

oppose

this

arrangement, and one in fact even sent letters supporting the
status

quo.

appointed

No

or

other

solicited

attorney,
to

qualified

represent

or

otherwise

defendant-appellant

was

Sonja

Swanson, who was thus left with no effective, conflict-free public
defender whatsoever.

Further, the legal system

in Washington

County seemed to view Brown, supra, as something to be side-stepped
with impunity.
2.

The

ineffective.
defendant.

public

defender

defendant-appellant

had

was

He appeared rushed and "too busy" to consult with
He refused, even after several requests, to copy her

with the most crucial discovery, including an alleged statement of
self-incrimination and police reports. He simply came to defendant
and said "They've got you—just plead guilty [straight-up]", which
she could have done by herself.

Defendant-appellant was thus

denied her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective
27

assistance of counsel.
3.

Appellate counsel and counsel for the ACLU of Utah were

required, at no offered compensation, to step into the vacuum
created by the above-described corrupt state of affairs, or no
justice whatsoever would have been even attempted.

Said counsel

were denied legal fees even though the trial court found defendant
indigent.

This court should award attorneys fees where the county

fails to provide conflict-free effective counsel, and not leave
public defender duties up to the volunteers while insider-appointed
and maintained "public defenders11 get paid for being ineffective.
4.

The Supreme Court, through its rulemaking powers and

inherent authority under the Constitution of Utah, should spell out
clearly the full scope of Brown-related

conflicts, as much as

possible and as suggested in this brief, in a general Order or Rule
so that

state

and

local

governments

and

their

employees

and

contract attorneys will not manipulate, evade, or sidestep Brown
over the years but will be held strictly accountable for Brown
violations.
5.

The appellate court should put some enforcement "teeth"

into its prior rulings by dismissing this prosecution, and others
like it, on the merits and with prejudice.

A reversal and remand

to an uncooperative justice system which appears to be contemptuous
of Brown, bar rulings, and of this very Court's inherent powers,
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would have only a "paper tiger" effect and would cause the Supreme
Court of Utah to lose respect and effectiveness.

It would also

subject the already victimized Appellant to retaliation and even
more abuse.
This Court must seriously "get the attention" of our local
governments, including some of the rural ones who are hundreds of
miles from appellate enforcement, federal review, and meaningful
oversight.

Interlocking conflicts of interest and "good ole boy"

justice should be meaningfully discouraged.
ideals suggested

Unfortunately, high

from afar often do not seem to penetrate in

Washington County.

What does make for constructive change will

require financial incentives and permanently lost cases. Immediate
and real incentives to Washington County and not at the expense of
an already victimized defendant should be ordered here today.

J.

ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE UNDIVIDED LOYALTY OF COUNSEL

It

is

axiomatic

that

defendants

in

felony

criminal

prosecutions are entitled to the assistance of counsel (Gideon v.
Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) as well as to effective assistance
of counsel (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983) ) , and see
also J-2 of this brief.

To deny same is to deny a defendant his

rights as guaranteed in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
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United States Constitution.

Id.

One of two fundamental aspects of effective representation
involves undivided loyalty of counsel.
U.S. 335
loyalty

In Covles v. Sullivan, 44 6

(1980), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the divided
of

counsel

constitutes

prima

facia

evidence

of

ineffectiveness.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a conflict of interest
involving counsel in a criminal case requires per se reversal.
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992).

The Brown court held

that a part-time prosecutor doing criminal defense constituted an
inherent conflict of interest.
Brown relied

on the

Supreme Court's

inherent

supervisory

powers over the courts and on public policy:
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally
impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial
responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we
conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system
are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist
in the defense of an accused. Consequently, we hold that as
a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent
supervisory power over the courts, counsel with concurrent
prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend
indigent persons; therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction
and order a new trial.
Id. at 856-57.
Supporting

the

Court's

concern

for the

integrity

of

the

criminal justice system, and inherent in it, is legislation passed
by elected representatives and signed by an elected governor—to
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wit, Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4), which cites as but one of the
minimum standards to be provided by each county for the defense of
indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts that said county
(4)
Assure undivided
client.

loyalty

of defense counsel to the

To some extent, whether an indigent accused of a felony has
the undivided

loyalty

However, where, as

of her

in the

counsel

instant

is a question

case, a clear

of fact.

conflict of

interest arises by virtue of membership or in association with or
integration into a lawfirm which prosecutes crimes and whose senior
partner has supervisory power over the prosecutor, jail, sheriff's
office, and public defender selection and retention and salary and
benefits, and same is established by competent and even clear and
convincing evidence, the question of undivided loyalty becomes one
of law, logic, ethics, and Supreme Court regulation.
Consider, for example, Utah Code Ann. 78-51-3 0, cited fully
supra at 15.

Here, an attorney who directly or indirectly advises

or defends, or aids in the defense where the prosecutor is directly
or indirectly connected as a partner, is guilty of a misdemeanor
and "shall be punished accordingly, and his license to practice may
be revoked or suspended."
suggesting

that Mr. Wright

Id.

In the case at bar, no one is

or Mr. Gallian

personally punished in any way.

or anyone

else be

But the intent of this statute,

particularly when taken in context with Brown, supra, underscores
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the sensitivity of conflicts precisely as they exist here.
some

argument

may

be

made

that

Gallian

and

Wright

While

are

not

"partners," they certainly had no hesitation in holding themselves
out to the public as a functionally integrated lawfirm, with shared
secretaries,

interfacing

confidences.

computers,

and

presumably

shared

They even share civil fees (at least) . Please see H-

2, ("Statement of Facts") above, and record for the full layout of
functional integration, which is far too lengthy to be re-recited
here.
These conflicts are even more patently offensive when U.C.A.
§67-16-4(3)(4), and (5) are considered in this context, involving
use of official positions or employment which interferes with the
ethical performance of public duties.

Please see p. 16, supra.

Other

interest

issues

involving

conflict

of

in

this

whole

relationship involve taking gifts or compensation if "it tends to
influence him in the discharge of his official duties, or is or may
be involved in governmental action directly affecting the donor or
lender...."

See U.C.A. §67-16-5(1)(a) and (b), set out more fully

at p. 16, supra.

Further,

No public officer or public employee shall have personal
investments in any business entity which will create a
substantial conflict between his private interests and his
public duties.
U.C.A. §67-16-9.
The integration and fee sharing between Commissioner Gallian
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and Public Defender Wright is hardly an arms-length relationship or
one free from the corruption and conflict set forth above and
elsewhere.

It is hardly a "rental" relationship, but one which for

months has corrupted justice in Washington County and which assured
Sonja Swanson, defendant-appellant herein, of the divided attention
and virtually no loyalty in her "defense"

whatsoever.

Further, ethical prohibitions against Brown violations by
lawfirm members have been in effect at all material times and
virtually ignored in the Washington County justice system.

See,

e.g., Rule Prof. Conduct 1.10(a):
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2. [Emphasis added].
Rule 1.7 is the general conflict of interest rule, and is cited in
full at 18 herein.
In short, Commissioner Gallian could not have defended Sonja
Swanson because he prosecuted criminal cases in the city of Ivins,
Utah.

His associate, John Hummel, simultaneously prosecuted in

Ivins as well and defended as Kanab public defender, even well
after Brown was published.

Clearly, neither of them could have

represented Sonja Swanson. And since MacArthur Wright held himself
out to the public as a part of a firm, shared telephone, offices,
secretaries, computer system, and admitted to being at least in an
office-sharing

situation,

he

could
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not

and

should

not

have

represented Sonia Swanson either. And this logical conclusion does
not even consider the geometrically compounded complications and
conflicts arising when, added to the above, one takes into account
Commissioner Gallian's control and

influence over prosecution,

police, jail, and public defender selection and retention by virtue
of his elected position in county government.

Nor does it factor

in the fact that Mr. Wright did not even attempt to defend Ms.
Swanson with any vigor, preferring, apparently, to "roll over" and
make life easier for everyone in the system,—except Sonja Swanson-by telling her to plead guilty and not let her have copies of her
own discovery for her own review and consideration.
There is much more that can be said here but space limitations
forbid.

Please see entire sections of cited law from Part F,

supra, pgs. 12-19, which further support the proposition that Ms.
Swanson was denied the undivided loyalty of her counsel, and that
both Washington County and her defender knew of that breach or
should

have

known,

but

ignored

Brown,

Rule

1.10,

and

other

authority, even though they were well aware of it.

2 . DEFENDANT-APPELLANTf S APPOINTED PUBLIC DEFENDER WAS WHOLLY
INEFFECTIVE. IN LIGHT OF HIS INABILITY TO PROVIDE UNDIVIDED LOYALTY
AND BECAUSE OF HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO ZEALOUSLY DEFEND HER.
For

the

criminal

justice
34

system

to

work,

and

to

have

credibility with the public and to provide true due process, both
sides,

particularly

the

defense,

must

engage

in

vigorous

prosecution

charges,

adversarial examination of fact and argument of law.
When

the

defense

simply

accedes

to

whether from underpayment overwork, weariness, boredom, or dislike
of accused persons, or any other reason, due process is denied, the
adversarial system is cheated, and, worse of all, the defendant is
sucked

through

an assembly-line processing,

into a Kalkaesque

nightmare.
It is to avoid this evil that Gideon, supra, held that "any
person hauled into court, who is too poor to have a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."

Id.

But a mere "right to counsel" rings hollow unless that counsel is
minimally effective.
The landmark case of Strickland v. Washington, supra. held
"that a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial
alongside the accused is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command."

Effectiveness in Strickland thus appears to be defined

by "what is reasonable under prevailing professional norms". Jd at
688.
As stated in D-2, supra, ineffectiveness occurs when counsel's
representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
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In the instant case, defendant-appellant was denied effective
assistance of counsel.
citations

supra),

Appellant

testified that her attorney was too busy to provide

effective

counsel;

to

the

At the Probable Cause hearing, (See, for

always

record,

seemed

"Facts,"

rushed;

p.

25,

refused,

even

after

several

requests, to give her even a copy of her own alleged confessions,
or any other discovery.

See U.C.A. §77-1-6.

He told her "they've

got you—just plead guilty," then speeded her through the system.
Her lawyer even testified under oath that "it was my policy not to
give [a police report of defendant's own stcitement to police] to an
accused, except in unusual circumstances...."
that

police

reports

"confidential,"

thus

and

other

precluding

the

He even suggested

discovery
accused

were
from

somehow

seeing

any

discovery pertaining to her own case.
While Appellant was being so "defended" she was confined,
without having been found guilty, in an illegal, overcrowded jail,
sleeping on the floor next to a common toilet.
anxious

over

sophisticated

the
in

welfare
the

of

her

intricacies

of

small

She was confused,

daughter,

criminal

was

defense,

procedurally or substantively, and was terrified.

not

either

She therefore

submitted to whatever her attorney said, including the lame refusal
to provide copies of her statements to police [she has since stated
that a substantial difference arose over what she was told was in
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the reports and what she actually read for herself in them].
Ms.

Swanson

then

pleaded

straight-up

to

a

second-degree

felony, even though she had several good defenses which could have
at least been tested, and even though she had no significant
criminal record.

Had Appellant gone to trial even without any

lawyer she would have been no worse off.

She still would have a

second-degree felony, and maybe less, but in no event more. And it
is doubtful that after a presentence investigation she would have
gone to prison or done any substantial jail time.

3.

WASHINGTON

COUNTY

WAS

REQUIRED

TO

PROVIDE

WHOLLY

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT;
SINCE IT REFUSED TO DO SO, HAVING FIRST FOUND APPELLANT INDIGENT,
WASHINGTON COUNTY SHOULD PAY REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES FOR THE
COUNSEL SHE DID CONVINCE TO ACCEPT HER CASE WITHOUT PAYMENT FROM
HER.
Appellant incorporates arguments in J-2 and J-3 above into
this section in support of the propositions that Washington County
refused to provide either wholly independent or effective counsel
for Appellant at any time.

Further, Appellant incorporates the

same arguments here in support of the proposition that Washington
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County

had

duties

arising

from

statute,

State

and

Federal

Constitutions, bar ethics, public policy, and Supreme Court mandate
based on inherent powers to provide conflict-free, independent,
competent, and reasonably zealous counsel to assist Appellant in
her defense of a serious felony charge.
Appellant respectfully suggests that it would appear to be
just and within this Courtfs inherent powers to award attorneys
fees for the services of her counsel in (a) challenging an unjust
conviction; (b) successfully obtaining a Certificate of Probable
Cause in her behalf, and

(c) appealing these issues to higher

courts.
There already exists statutory authority in support of the
proposition that Washington County must provide such counsel (see,
e.g. , U.C.A.

§77-32-1 and §7-32-2

(effective April

27, 1992).

Present counsel requested attorneys fees already from the District
Court, and same was denied.
Attorneys Fees".

See Addendum, App. 3, "Order Denying

U.C.A. §77-27-56 authorizes attorneys fees in

civil cases, and UrCivP 81(e) authorizes application of the Rules
of Civil Procedure to criminal cases.
Further, U.C.A. §77-32-2(1) is not limited to district courts
for two reasons:

(1)

"the court on its own motion or otherwise"

may order counsel appointed for an indigent accused.

There is no

reason to believe that "the court" is limited only to inferior
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courts; (2) It appears to be logical and reasonable to accept the
proposition

that an appellate

court

is not

less able than a

district court to exercise either its inherent authority pursuant
to CONST. OF UTAH Art VIII §§3 and 4, or under statute, such as
§77-32-2.

Please see p. 14 of this brief, supra, for Art. VIII §§3

and 4 in full.
If there was ever a compelling reason for a court to appoint
counsel under §77-32-2(c)(iii), then it is in this case.
all,

such

an

order

appears

"necessary

for

the... complete determination of any cause."

the

First of

exercise

Id, §3

of

[emphasis

added].
Why is such an order necessary?

Because, as a matter of

common sense and practical, realistic administration of justice,
the legal system simply cannot be expected to rely fully on public
interest or pro bono lawyers, working for no fees whatsoever, to
meet

the compelling

demands

of

a competent

defense of those accused of felonies.

and

conflict-free

It is unreasonable and

unjust to permit payment of fees to public defenders who do not
defend effectively or render undivided loyalty to their clients and
at the same time to deny such fees to those who actually do so
defend, where those paid have refused to.

A train of de facto

free public defenders of those whom the justice system tramples
over should not be a substitute for just compensation for defender
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services.
Washington County did not offer Ms. Swanson any alternatives.
This situation is not one where an indigent accused rejects an
appointed attorney and says, "I desire Mr. or Ms. X, a prominent
defense attorney, to represent me at county expense, not my
assigned public defender." Rather, this is a case where absolutely
nobody, except for the ACLU and present counsel, were willing to
become involved at all and to try to undo the damage her previously
appointed counsel wreaked, particularly invoking the costs, risks,
and retaliations which are always inherent in such actions.
Further, it is not unreasonable to assume that for each case
like the instant one where new counsel intervened, that there are
many, many more where "roll-over" justice is the norm, and the
routine.

It therefore would serve a valid public policy objective

to give counties the incentive to provide a decent public defender
structure by making it more costly for them to be unjust than it is
to be just, at least where helpless indigents accused of felonies
are involved.
Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
order Washington County to pay her attorneys fees in bringing this
appeal, as well as for the Certificate of Probable Cause, which
would not have been sought, and therefore not granted, absent new
counsels• intervention.
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4.
CLEAR

COUNTIES AND CITIES AS WELL AS

AND

UNEQUIVOCAL

"BRIGHT

LINE"

PUBLIC DEFENDERS, NEED A
RULE

WHERE

CONFLICTS

OF

INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED,
In the instant case, both Brown, supra, CPR Rule 1.10, supra,
and other law and rule prohibiting the conduct and conflicts of
interest complained of here were in effect and wholly disregarded
by the Washington County justice system.
not

be

stubbornly

non-cooperative

Local governments should

in providing

effective

and

conflict-free public defenders.
One way that this court can get the attention of rural justice
systems in Utah is to expand the scope of Brown, by Supreme Court
Order, to integrate into one order that which is now scattered
throughout the legal landscape in various statutes, cases, ethical
opinions, and CPRs.
It is respectfully suggested that the Court make the following
order or one substantially similar to it, violation of which will
result in automatic per se reversal and dismissal of criminal
cases:
(a) "An attorney who is employed by or on contract with any
statement government or agency or subdivision thereof, or holding
any elective or appointed office, whether paid or unpaid, in any
state government or subdivision thereof, in any capacity, shall not
defend any person accused of a crime, particularly the indigent,
who have no choice in the selection of their legal counsel".
(b) "What an attorney cannot do, neither can that attorney's
partner, associate, of counsel designee, office-sharer, tenant,
landlord, or anyone else associated with that attorney in a way
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which presents any conflict of interest, however slight, whether
potential or actual, or even in appearance, in assuring the
undivided loyalty to one accused of a crime".
With such an order, the system of justice in Utah might be
delivered

in a more

clearly

understandable

manner, with

less

contempt for defendants1 rights under law, and without the chronic
and blatant ignoring and sidestepping of fundamental due process as
guaranteed in the Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution as well as Sections 7 and 12 of Article I of
the Utah Constitution.
The possibility that meaningful justice might be more costly
should not be as much of a concern as the protection of inalienable
rights of our citizenry.
tossed

aside

as

Nor should those presumed innocent be

"nobodies"

and

given

contemptuous

legal

representation in some effort to save a few dollars, or for any
other reason.

5.

THIS

COURT

SHOULD

ORDER

APPELLANTS

CRIMINAL

CHARGES

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS HERE AND NOW, RATHER
THAN REMANDING HER BACK TO A HOSTILE. AND VINDICTIVE JUSTICE SYSTEM
WHICH HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED A STUBBORN RESISTANCE TO PROVIDING
APPELLANT WITH FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS.
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should not
merely reverse and remand Ms. Swanson's case back to Washington
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County.

Ms. Swanson has already suffered enough.

She has been

confined in an illegally overcrowded jail, forced to "sleep" on the
floor next to a common toilet (see "Facts", at 19, supra) , been
railroaded through a system unwilling to provide her with even the
most rudimentary due process, and harassed by a hostile district
court judge in ways set forth, with transcript support, above.
Simply because Ms. Swanson1s home was invaded by five armed men,
who kept her virtually naked during inquisition and who claimed to
have found a small amount of controlled substances in her purse,
and just because Ms. Swanson was then jailed, provided with a
conflict-ridden

legal

counsel

who

treated

her

with

contempt,

indifference, and ineffectiveness does not justify putting her
through the grinder again.

This is not just a situation where "a

criminal goes free because the constable bungled."

We have here

not one officer's "bungle," as with a Miranda violation, perhaps,
but an entire system, from Judge to prosecutor to public defender
to voyeuristic arresting officers, who did more than "bungle".
Rather,

individually

and

as

a

whole,

they

did

wilfully

and

contemptuously rape due process and rendered cruel and unusual
punishment to one assumed to be innocent.

The only meaningful

remedy for Sonja Swanson, Appellant herein, is dismissal here and
now of all her charges, with prejudice and on the merits.

Then

perhaps the next potential victim of "Dixie justice" will not be so
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abused.
and

This Court has that inherent power under U.C.A. §78-2-2(2)

(3), particularly

(3), and Art. VIII §§3 & 4 of the Utah

Constitution.

K.

CONCLUSION

There is an alarming trend which has taken place over the past
decade or more in our country, in the rural areas particularly,
which are reminiscent of the proverbial "southern justice."

While

it may be too much to ask this Court in this case to right all of
the wrongs in all rural justice systems in Utah, this Court can and
must get the attention of the one before it, i.e., the Washington
County justice system.

This Court can do so by granting the

specific remedies set forth above and hereby prayed for in summary
form:
1.

Finding that Appellant was denied wholly

independent

counsel in the District Court; reversal of her conviction, and
dismissal by this Court of her prosecution on the merits and with
prejudice;
2. Finding that Appellant was denied the effective assistance
of

counsel, particularly

in the

context

of

his

conflicts

of

interest; that same was harmful to her and fell below the standard
of care required

in Strickland and elsewhere; reversal of her

conviction therefore and dismissal of her prosecution on the merits
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and with prejudice;
3. Attorneys fees and costs of court for her present counsel,
including the additional assistance rendered by the ACLU;
4.

An order

clarifying

the scope of Brown

and

related

conflicts of interest in providing defense to indigents accused of
felonies.

A proposed two-part order is set forth above, which

Appellant requests be promulgated by the Court in substantially
similar form;
5.

Such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

deems

appropriate and proper, both in fashioning a full range of remedies
for Appellant as well as in correcting

abuses

in the

justice

system, and particularly involving the public defender system in
Washington County and throughout Utah.
Respectfully submitted this

/
day of

<>u^y^

,

1993.

R^CLAYJON 4i(ll^T^MAN
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

/z

<
On the
day of December, 1993, I do hereby certify that
I mailed jfc. true and complete ccjai^; of the above and foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT by placing same in the United States Post
Office, postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:

JtoO

^<M^
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Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
R. CL&YTON HUNTSMAN
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant
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A
ADDENDUM
Citations:
(a)

UCA §77-32-1 et seq (complete)

(b)

UCA §78-27-56

(c)

URCP Rule 81(e)

(d)

Utah Rules App. Proc. Rule 43

(e)

URCrimP Rule 22

(f)

URProfC Rules 7.1 & 7.2

(g)

Scope, p. 955, CODE JUD. ADM.
(purpose, etc. of Bar Rules)

UTAH STATE BAR OPINION NO. 34 (1976)
ORDERS FROM LOWER COURT:
(a)

Order Denying Attorneys Fees

(b)

Order Finding Indigency (etc.)

EXHIBITS
(a)

Gallian, etc.-Wright stationery

(b)

Gallian, etc.-Wright U.S. West Telephone Book
Advertisement

77-32-1

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 32
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS
Section
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by
county for defense of indigent defendants.
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of
defendant or order of court.
77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation.
77-32-4. Time for determination of indigency.
77-32-5. Expenses of printing briefs, depositions, and transcripts.

Section
77-32-6. Governing bodies of counties or municipalities to appoint counsel or
provide through legal aid associations.
77-32-7. Expenditures of county or municipal
funds declared proper — Tax levy
authorized.
77-32-8. Pro bono criminal representation —
Liability limits.

77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent defendants.
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts
and various administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of his liberty;
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of
other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch.
52, § 1.

Cross-Rsferences. — Criminal lineup,
right to have attorney present, § 77-8-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appointment of counsel.

ANALYSIS

Appointment of counsel.
—-Judicial act.
Attorney for allegedly insane person.
City ordinance violations.
Compensation.
Denial of counsel in city court.
Federal court intervention.
Federal court proceedings.
Inapplicable to hearing for parole revocation.
Necessity for investigator.
Payment of investigator by county.
Petition to county for appointment of investigator.

—Judicial act
The placement of this section in Title 77
rather than Title 78 indicates that it is not
designed to change the inherently judicial act
of appointing counsel. Edwards v. Hare, 682 F.
Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988).
A judge's actions in carrying out the power
to appoint counsel and set bail, including the
mechanics of obtaining counsel, are judicial;
thus where the court was unable to locate
counsel, its decision to accept accused's plea
without his having counsel was judicial, and
any purported failure to carry out a responsi-
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biiity to obtain counsel and set appropriate bail
was protected by absolute immunity. Edwards
v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988).

not obligated to pay for counsel for indigents in
subsequent actions in federal
court.
Lamoreaux v. Grand County, 28 Utah 2d 92,
498 P.2d 659 (1972).

Attorney for allegedly insane person.
An attorney appointed by court to represent
allegedly insane person, under separate statute providing that court appoint counsel to represent patient in involuntary proceeding to determine sanity, was not entitled to recover
claim against county. Bedford v. Salt Lake
County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).

Inapplicable to hearing for parole revocation.
Parolee was not entitled to be provided counsel at hearing on revocation of his parole since
intent of legislature was to limit right of counsel in matters subsequent to conviction and
sentence to appeals, applications for writs of
habeas corpus, and for writs of coram nobis —
matters affecting guilt or innocence and fairness of trials by which those ends were accomplished; it did not refer to revocation of paroles.
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624
(1969).

City ordinance violations.
Couny did not have duty to pay for legal
counsel assigned by city courts to represent
persons charged with city ordinance violations.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 520
P.2d 211 (Utah 1974).
Compensation.
Statute was mandatory but if county made
no arrangements for representation of indigent
defendants in criminal cases, court could appoint counsel but court had no authority to order county to pay attorney so appointed. Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d
189 (1968).
Denial of counsel in city court
Where indigent was not provided with counsel in city court hearing on Nevada extradition
request, but was subsequently provided with
counsel in order to make application to the district court for writ of habeas corpus, his rights
were not prejudiced since he had full opportunity, with the aid of counsel, to present any
matter relating to his extradition at the district court habeas corpus hearing. Myers v.
Hadley, 16 Utah 2d 405, 402 P.2d 701 (1965).
Federal court intervention.
Parolee who was charged in city court with
misdemeanor, conviction on which could have
resulted in his imprisonment for as long as seventeen years and five months, was not entitled
to federal court injunction against his prosecution without appointed counsel since he had an
adequate remedy under state law, parole was a
matter of grace, the claimed injury was not
great, immediate and irreparable, and injunction would not satisfactorily eliminate danger
to parole status. Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d
713 (10th Cir. 1972).
Federal court proceedings.
Counties of Utah were obligated to provide
counsel for indigent defendants only in connection with proceedings in state courts and were

77-32-1

Necessity for investigator.
District court order authorizing court-appointed counsel for defendant to employ investigator and requiring county to pay therefor
could not be enforced where there was no reasonable basis on which to justify appointment
of investigator. Washington County v. Day, 22
Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968).
Denial of defendant's application for an investigator at public expense was not prejudicial in the absence of a showing that an investigation would have helped to establish that he
did not commit the homicide or that information gained from an investigation of the defendant's childhood would have aided physicians
in their psychiatric examination of the defendant. State v. Cote, 27 Utah 2d 24 r 492 P.2d
986 (1972).
Payment of Investigator by county.
Once investigator had been properly appointed under statute and rendered services to,
and incurred expenses in behalf of, accused indigent, he was entitled to be paid therefor by
county and should have filed his claim under
statutes providing for presentation of claims
against county. Washington County v. Day, 22
Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968).
Petition to county for appointment of investigator.
Court was without authority to order county
to provide and pay for investigator appointed
by the court, in absence of petition by counsel,
whether appointed by county or by court, to
county to appoint investigator. Washington
County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189
(1968).
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77-32-2

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. Mitchell:
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Counsel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933.
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? Strickland v. Washington
and National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev.
723.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 732-769, 809, 810, 976-997.
A.L.R. — Accused's right to assistance of
counsel at or prior to arraignment, 5 A.L.R.3d
1269.
Circumstance giving rise to conflict of interest between or among criminal codefendants
precluding representation by same counsel, 34
A.L.R.3d 470.
Attorney's refusal to accept appointment to
defend indigent, or to proceed in such defense,
as contempt, 36 A.L.R.3d 1221.

Right to assistance of counsel u
to revoke probation, 44 A.L.R.3d ;
Determination of indigency of i
tling him to appointment of
A.L.R.3d 1108.
Accused's right to choose particularl
appointed to assist him, 66 A.L.R.3d L
Relief available for violation of right V<
sel at sentencing in state criminal
A.L.R.4th 183.
^Right of indigent defendant in state c
case to assistance of ballistics experts/^
A.L.R.4th 638.
Right of indigent defendant in state <
case to assistance of fingerprint expert^
A.L.R.4th 874.
Key Numbers. — Criminal
641-641.13.

77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or
order of court.
"*^S|i
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is underl
arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability5!
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if::
(1) The defendant requests it; or
**
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be
represented.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 52, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
City ordinance violations.
Misdemeanor charge.
In general.
This section is nothing more than a codification of the constitutional rights to assistance of
counsel and self-representation. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), affd, 776
P.2d 631 (Utah 1989).
City ordinance violations.
County did not have duty to pay for legal
counsel assigned by city courts to represent
persons charged with city ordinance violations.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 520
P.2d 211 (Utah 1974).
Misdemeanor charge.
Parolee who was charged in court with mis-

demeanor, conviction on which could have resulted in his imprisonment for as long as seventeen years and five months, was not entitled
to federal court injunction against his prosecution without appointed counsel since he had an
adequate remedy under state law, parole was a
matter of grace, the claimed injury was not
great, immediate and irreparable, and injunction would not satisfactorily eliminate danger
to parole status. Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d
713 (10th Cir. 1972).
While indigent accused in municipal court of
misdemeanor with maximum six-month sentence had right to counsel, he did not have constitutional right to counsel at public expense.
Hortencio v. Fillis, 25 Utah 2d 73, 475 P.2d
1011 (1970), cert, denied 402 U.S. 966, 91 S.
Ct. 1636, 29 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971).
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77-32-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What constitutes assertion of right
to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622.

77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation.
(1) When representing an indigent person the assigned counsel shall:
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the proceeding following
assignment; and
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other remedies before or after
conviction that he considers to be in the interest of justice except for other
and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section
to represent an indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a
discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first appeal of right to assure
the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in
the context of the appellate process of this state.
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant shall be entitled to compensation upon the approval of the district court where the original trial was
held, upon a showing that the defendant has been denied a constitutional
right or that there was newly discovered evidence that would show the defendant's innocence and that the legal services rendered by counsel were other
than that required under this act or under a separate fee arrangement and
were necessary for the indigent defendant and not for the purpose of delaying
the judgment of the original trier of fact.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1981, eh.

77-32-4. Time for determination of indigency.
The determination of indigency may be made by the court at any time.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32-5. Expenses of printing briefs, depositions, and transcripts.
The expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first appeals of right on
behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as depositions and other transcripts
shall be paid by the state, county, or municipal agency that prosecuted the
defendant at trial.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 3; 1988, ch.
248, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective April 25,1988, inserted "state"
before "county" and added "or municipal
agency that prosecuted the defendant at trial"
at the end of the section.
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77-32-6. Governing bodies of counties or municipal!!
appoint counsel or provide through legal a
sociations.
~*
Governing bodies of counties, cities and towns shall either
(1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this \*
ter by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding
reasonable compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate i
erning body; or
(2) Arrange to provide those services through non-profit legal aidH
other associations.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. — Claims against cities,
§ 10-6-139.

Claims against counties, § 17-15-10.
Claims against towns, § 10-5-123.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
compensate attorneys appointed to represent^!

ANALYSIS

• indigent criminal defendant on appeal on!|
Attorneys' claims for compensation.
Reasonable compensation.
Cited.
Attorneys' claims for compensation.
Attorneys' claim for services rendered m
representing indigent criminal defendants
should have been filed with the county, and
appealed to a court if rejected by the county but
should not have been filed directly in a district
court. State v. Dixon, 22 Utah 2d 58, 448 P.2d
716 (1968)
County could not avoid its statutory duty to

ground that claim was not filed in strict accor^f
dance with § 17-15-10. Hatch v. Weberi
County, 23 Utah 2d 144, 459 P.2d 436 (1969)^
Reasonable compensation.
^t'
Schedule allowing attorney $15 per hour for *
m-court work and $10 per hour for out-of-court
work plus reasonable expenses for representing indigent defendants was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable Bennett v Davis
County, 26 Utah 2d 225, 487 P.2d 1271 (1971)
Cited m Edwards v Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528
(D Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
A.L.R. — Construction of state statutes pro-

viding for compensation of attorney for services under appointment by court in defending
indigent accused, 18 A.LR.3d 1074.

77-32-7. Expenditures of county or municipal funds declared proper — Tax levy authorized.
All expenditures by the counties and the incorporated cities or towns which
are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes defined in this chapter
including donations to non-profit legal aid or other associations charged with
the duty to provide the services are declared to be proper uses of public funds
and the counties and incorporated areas of the state are authorized to levy and
collect taxes for such purposes.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-32a-l

77-32-8. Pro bono criminal representation — Liability
limits.
Counsel assigned by a court to represent a person found indigent in criminal, post-conviction, or habeas corpus proceedings is immune from suit if he
provides the legal services:
(1) at no cost or for only a substantially reduced cost that is applied to
but does not cover expenses of the service; and
(2) without gross negligence or willful misconduct.
History: C. 1953, 77-32-8, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 99, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Ch. 99 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 32a
DEFENSE COSTS
Section
77-32a-l.
77-32a-2.
77-32a-3.
77-32a-4.
77-32a-5.
77-32a-6.
77-32a-7.
77-32a-8.

Section
77-32a-9.

Restitution and costs — Convicted defendant may be required to pay
Costs — What constitute.
Ability to pay considered.
Petition for remission of payment
of costs.
Time and method of payment.
Payment as condition of probation
or suspended sentence.
Default m payment as contempt
— Order to show cause — Warrant of arrest.
Default in payment as contempt
— What constitutes contempt
— Imprisonment.

77-32a-10.
77-32a-ll
77-32a-12.
77-32a-13.
77-32a-14.

Costs imposed on corporation or
association — Duty to pay —
Contempt.
Imprisonment for contempt —
Limitations.
Default not constituting contempt
— Relief allowed.
Collection of payment in default
— Execution.
Docketing judgment for costs.
Verified statement of time and expenses of counsel for indigent
defendants.

77-32a-l. Restitution and costs — Convicted defendant
may be required to pay.
In a criminal action the court may require a convicted defendant to make
restitution and pay costs.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-l, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Restitution to victims
of crime, § 76-3-201.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Testing
the Limits of the Court's Exclusive Junsdiction in Fraud Cases: Discharge vs. Cnmmal
Restitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rev 61.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs
T§ 100-112; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 1036-1050.

C.J.S. — 20 CJ.S. Costs §§ 435-467
A.L.R. — Institutional sentencing under
Victim and Witness Protection Act § 5 (18
USCS §§ 3579, 3580), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 724.
Key Numbers. — Costs *=» 284-325.
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77-32a-2. Costs — What constitute.
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state o r H 9
political subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, including attorwfl
fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant to Sectrai
77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherenf^m
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must M !
made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot!
include attorneys' fees of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by thai
prosecution for investigators or witnesses.
^^
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32a-3. Ability to pay considered.
The court shall not include in the judgment a sentence that a defendant paj
costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the
amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take account of the
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose and that restitution be the first priority.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-3, enacted by L.
1980, eh. 15, § 2.

77-32a-4. Petition for remission of payment of costs.
A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in contumacious default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court
which sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid
portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of
the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs, or
modify the method of payment under Section 77-32a-5.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 460
Key Numbers. — Costs «= 319.

77-32a-5. Time and method of payment.
When a defendant is sentenced to pay costs, the court may grant permission
for payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If no such permission is included m the sentence the costs shall be
payable forthwith.
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77-32a-8

History: C. 1953, 77-32a-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 459.
Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 318.

77-32a-6. Payment as condition of probation or suspended
sentence.
When a defendant sentenced to pay costs is also placed on probation or
imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make payment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity of requirement that, as
condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs, 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.

77-32a-7. Default in payment as contempt — Order to
show cause — Warrant of arrest.
When a defendant sentenced to pay costs defaults in the payment thereof or
of any installment, the court on motion of the attorney general or the county
attorney or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his
default should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue an order to
show cause or a warrant of arrest for his appearance.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Contempt, Chapter
32 of Title 78.

77-32a-8. Default in payment as contempt — What constitutes contempt — Imprisonment.
Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to
make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his
default constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the costs or a
specified part thereof, are paid.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur 2d Costs § 110,
21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1049.

C.J.S. — 20 C.J S Costs § 464
Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 322.

77-32a-9. Costs imposed on corporation or association —
Duty to pay — Contempt.
When costs are imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is
the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the
corporation or association to pay the costs from those assets, and his failure to
do so may be held to be contempt unless he makes the showing required in
Section 77-32a-8 of this act.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32a-10. Imprisonment for contempt — Limitations.
The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of costs shall be set
forth in the commitment order, and shall not exceed one day for each $25 of
the costs, 30 days if the costs were imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor,
or six months in the case of a felony, whichever is the shorter period. A person
committed for nonpayment of costs shall be given credit toward payment for
each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment order.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Costs § 110,
21A Am Jur 2d Criminal Law § 1049

77-32a-ll.

C.J.S. — 20 C J S Costs § 464.
Key Numbers. — Costs e=> 322.

Default not constituting contempt — Relief allowed.

If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment
of costs is not contempt, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant
additional time for payment, reducing the amount thereof or of each installment or revoking the costs or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-ll, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32a-12. Collection of payment in default — Execution.
A default in the payment of costs or any installment thereof may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The
levy of execution for the collection of costs shall not discharge a defendant
committed to imprisonment for contempt until the amount of the costs has
actually been collected.
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History: C. 1953, 77-32a-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32a-14

Cross-References. — Execution to enforce
judgment, Rule 69, Rules of Civil Procedure

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur. 2d Costs § 110;
21A Am Jur 2d Criminal Law § 1049

C.J.S. — 20 C J S Costs §§ 461-463
Key Numbers. — Costs <s=> 320

77-32a-13. Docketing judgment for costs.
A judgment that the defendant pay costs may be docketed in the same
manner as a judgment in a civil action.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-13, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-32a-14. Verified statement of time and expenses of
counsel for indigent defendants.
The court may require a verified statement of time and expenses from
appointed counsel or the nonprofit legal aid or other association providing
counsel to convicted indigent defendants in order to establish the costs, if any,
which will be included in the judgment.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-14, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER 33
UNIFORM RENDITION OF PRISONERS
AS WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS ACT
Section
77-33-1.
77-33-2.
77-33-3.

77-33-4.

77-33-5.

Definitions.
Summoning prisoner in this state
to testify in another state —
Certificate of out-of-state judge
Summoning prisoner in this state
to testify in another state —
Hearing — Issuance of order to
attend.
Summoning pnsoner in this state
to testify in another state — Order to provide for return, safeguards on custody, and payment of expenses.
Rendition procedure inapplicable
to person confined as insane or
mentally ill or under sentence
of death.

Section
77-33-6.
77-33-7.

77-33-8

77-33-9.
77-33-10
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Prisoner m another state summoned to testify in this state —
Certificate of judge.
Prisoner in another state summoned to testify in this state —
Order of compliance with terms
and conditions prescribed by
out-of-state judge.
Exemption of pnsoner from another state from arrest or service of process.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Citation — Uniform Rendition of
Prisoners as Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Act.
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77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county ftiilBHS9H
fense of indigent defendants.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

— Prosecutors.
Cited.

gent persons. This is a per se rule requiring
reversal of the conviction when such a conflict
occurs. State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
(1992).

— Prosecutors.
Counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend mdi-

Cited in State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

ANALYSIS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of indigent defendant in
state criminal case to assistance of investigators, 81 A.L.R.4th 259.

77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or
order of court.
(1) Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is
under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial
probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or
prison if:
(a) the defendant requests it; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity
to be represented.
(2) (a) If the county, city, or town responsible to provide for the legal defense of an indigent defendant has arranged by contract to provide those
services and the court has received notice or a copy of such contract, the
court shall appoint the contracting attorney as legal counsel to represent
that defendant.
(b) The court shall select and appoint the attorney or attorneys if:
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys; or
(ii) the contract is with an additional attorney or attorneys in the
event of a conflict of interest.
(c) If the court considers the appointment of a noncontracting attorney
to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of
an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice of
such contract, before the court may make the appointment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice to the attorney of the responsible county,
city, or town of the hearing; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney.
(d) The indigent defendant's mere preference for other counsel shall
not be considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a
noncontracting attorney.
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COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 52, § 2; 1992, ch.
161, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

77-32-6

ment, effective April 27, 1992, designated the
provisions of this section as Subsection (1)
made related designation and stylistic changes
in that subsection, and added Subsection (2)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

probability that the penalty imposed would in
elude a jail term was entitled to appointed
counsel at public expense City of St George v
Smith, 181 Utah Adv Rep 69 (Ct App 1992)
, Q , r
r
A;'lX*V* f*
loaof
(Utah Ct App 1992)

City ordinance violations
^lted
City ordinance violations.
A criminal defendant charged with violating
a city ordinance where there was a substantial

77-32-2.1. Hearing — Court to consider authorization or
designation of facilities — Standard.
(1) If a county, city, or town has contracted for or otherwise made arrangements for the appropriate facilities necessary for a complete defense of an
indigent defendant, including a competent investigator or investigators, the
court shall conduct a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to
consider the authorization or designation of noncontract facilities
(2) The court shall make findings that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a noncontractmg facility for the indigent defendant before it may authorize or designate the same
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2.1, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 161, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 161 be-

came effective on April 27, 1992 pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, § 25

77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Merits of appeal.
It is for the appellate court, not counsel, to
decide whether a case is wholly frivolous, thus,
it was error to allow withdrawal of appointed

counsel or to refuse to appoint counsel on the
basis that appointed counsel did not believe a
proposed appeal had merit Sandy City v
Brown, 827 P 2d 953 (Utah Ct App 1992)

77-32-6. Governing bodies of counties or municipalities to
appoint counsel or provide through legal aid associations.
Governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns shall either
(1) authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chapter by appointing a qualified attorney m each case and awarding him
reasonable compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate governing body, or
(2) arrange by contract to provide those services through nonprofit legal aid, other associations, or attorneys
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History: C. 1953, 77-32-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1992, ch. 161, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, inserted a

comma in the introductory language, and inserted "by contract" and substituted "legal aid,
other associations, or attorneys" for "legal aid
or other associations" in Subsection (2)

CHAPTER 32a
DEFENSE COSTS
Section
77-32a-2

Costs — What constitute

77-32a-2. Costs — What constitute.
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state or any
political subdivision in investigating, searching for, apprehending, and prosecuting the defendant, including attorney fees of counsel assigned to represent
the defendant pursuant to Section 77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial
or expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot include attorneys' fees for prosecuting attorneys.
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1993, ch. 238, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3. 1993, inserted "investigating, searching for, apprehending, and" in

the first sentence, deleted "or expenses mcurred by the prosecution for investigators or
witnesses" after "prosecuting attorneys" in the
last sentence, and made stylistic changes

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Investigation costs.
The expense of an examination of a sexual
assault victim was a cost incurred by the prosecution in the course of the investigation and
before the filing of the criminal information. It

could not have been assessed against defendant as a cost, costs of investigation are mehgible for restitution State v Depaoli, L91 Utah
Adv Rep 3 (1992)

77-32a-3. Ability to pay considered.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Findings required
Cited
Findings required.
Case was remanded for supplementary findings on the questions of restitution and responsibility for attorney fees, together with such

additional proceedings as might be necessary
to permit the making of adequate findings,
where there was no record to demonstrate compliance with this section State v Has-on, 811
P.2d 929 (Utah Ct App 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 836 P2d 1383 (Utah 1992)
Cited in State v Brown, 201 Utah Adv Rep
4 (1992)
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev 355.

78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boan
inherent risks and limitations on liabilil
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent4
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks o
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchhne in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of hmitations'fl^HB
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, c h ^ u f i H

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action o r i m
fense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's feeglfllB
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense t o 3 f l
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, excHH
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees again&S
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the actSffl
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding » M
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92,!,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted thee
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where nott
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); MM
stituted "shall" for "may" following ''the coarfj
in Subsection (1), added "except under SubeeS
tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and addeli
Subsection (2)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer
Discretion of court.
Essential elements.
Findings
Frivolous appeal.
Hearing
State of mind

"Without merit" and "good faith"
Cited.
Breach of covenant of good faith by to*
surer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not
show the bad faith necessary for an award under this section Canyon Country Store ••
Bracey, 781 P 2d 414 (Utah 1989)

442

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Discretion of court
It is within the trial court's discretion to determine bad faith under this section. Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah
1989).
An award of attorney fees premised on a
finding of bad faith is, to an extent, a matter
within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate deference is owed to the trial judge who
actually presided over the proceeding and has
first-hand familiarity with the litigation. Utah
"Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193
[(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
r Essential elements.
This section clearly states that the court
lihall award attorney fees to the prevailing
r only if it determines (1) that the action is
rithout merit and (2) that the action was
ought in bad faith. If the court finds both
i of the statute, then it has no discrei and must award reasonable attorney fees
l the prevailing party. Watkiss & Campbell v.
& Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
ree requirements must be met before the
shall award attorney fees: (1) the party
t prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the opparty must have been without merit,
I (3) the claim must not have been brought
^asserted in good faith. Hermes Assocs. v.
rtj Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct.
1991).
fs.

' this section, a trial court must make
that: (1) the claim or claims were
at merit," and (2) the party did not act
I faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
f section does not require written findi the bad faith issue. If a court finds bad
. in its discretion limits or awards no
\ fees, Subsection (2Kb) does, however,
.written findings. Canyon Country
^Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
appeal.
eal brought from an action which is
f determined to be in bad faith is necesvolous under Utah R. App. P. 33. Utah

78-27-56

Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Hearing.
This section does not require a trial court to
hold a hearing to determine if a party has been
"stubbornly litigious" or if an action was without merit. Canyon County Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
State of mind.
The existence of bad faith, which must be
shown under this section, is a subjective question of state of mind. Canyon County Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
"Without merit" and "good faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief
that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983).
To prove that a claim is "without merit," the
party asserting an award of attorney fees must
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous"
or "of little weight or importance having no
basis in law or fact." Second, the party must
prove that the plaintiffs conduct in bringing
the suit was lacking in good faith. Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The "without merit" determination is a question of law, and therefore the appellate court
will review it for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis,
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A finding of bad faith is a question of fact
and is reviewed by the appellate court under
the "clearly erroneous" standard. Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush,
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v.
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d
60 (Utah 1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Regional Sales
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Cascade Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
w Review. — Attorney's Fees in
\ Utah L. Rev. 553.
8 Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless AcUtah L. Rev. 593.
elopments in Utah Law — Legislents — Attorney's Fees, 1989
. 342.
Negligent Infliction of Emotional
New Cause of Action in Utah,"
Rev. 571.

A.L.R. — Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209.
Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 44 A.L.R.4th 776.
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for statecourt award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486.
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Rule 81

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including 1
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except]
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of j _
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice j
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or i
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the sp
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in cor
sistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of pr_
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there ~
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied dqesr
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
City courts. — Former § 78-4-32, as enacted by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 1, transferred the
jurisdiction and powers of the city courts to the
municipal departments of the circuit courts.
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, see
Chapter 4, Title 78.

Cross-References. — Ad
making Act, § 63-46a-l et seq.Al
Circuit courts generally, § 7fi
Justice courts generally, §7fi
Uniform Probate Code, Titled

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administrative proceedings.
City and justices' courts.
Criminal proceedings.
Special statutory proceedings.
Cited.
Administrative proceedings.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to a proceeding before an administrative body seeking to regulate activities burdened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955).
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor clearly
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial
Commission and therefore supplements the
procedure of the Commission. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204
(1965).
Where road commission's order that sign be
removed had been followed by negotiations and
correspondence between parties as advertiser
sought modification of order, district court had
jurisdiction to review order in proceedings instituted within thirty days of commission's definite and final refusal to change its order, notwithstanding that notice of the order had been
given advertiser several months before. National Adv. Co. v. Utah State Rd. Comm'n, 26
Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971).
Where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment
as to the nature of the legal relationship between the No-Fault Insurance Act and the
Workmen's Compensation Act and no facts
were required to be pleaded or proved, there
was no need to exhaust the administrative
remedies prior to seeking a declaratory judgment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d
296 (Utah 1975).
Although the Insurance Code specifically
outlines procedures governing appeals from
the Insurance Commissioner's decisions, there
is nothing therein which is inconsistent or in

conflict with the application of t
Civil Procedure which provide
the time to appeal. Utah Chirop
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,!
(Utah 1978).
The one-month time limit forap
mer Rule 73 applied to appeals i
ance Commissioner's decisions
mer Insurance Code, since
scheme (former §§ 31-4-9 and 31-4-1 %
provide for any limit. Utah Chirop
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y^
1327 (Utah 1978).
An appeal from the Utah
Commission is governed by Subdiv:
and, thus, must be made within 30 <
Commission's notice to a litigant of j
sion. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Ufa
of Transp., 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1 9 ^ |
City and justices' courts.
Although Rule 55(a)(2) and Rule 5(ay
that no service or notice need be i
party in default, the time for appeal 1^
default judgment in a city court (nowA
court) ran from date of notice of entry <
judgment rather than from the date i
ment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. '
Utah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but t
58A(d)).
Criminal proceedings.
Former §§ 77-46-1 and 77-46-2 mi
rule and the Rules of Civil Procedure j.
ing to discovery inapplicable to discova
criminal cases. State v. Nielsen, 522 P. AJ
(Utah 1974).
Rule 52 applies to criminal actions.
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
Special statutory proceedings.
An action to remove a city commissioner*
malfeasance in office is a special statutory!
tion to which the Rules of Civil Procedural
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1

licable. State v Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345,
p.2d 12 (1961).
e taking of depositions pursuant to the
Rules of Civil-Procedure is applicable in
action to remove a public official from office
Wlfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v.
"
11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961).
•*e 65B(b) is "clearly inapplicable" to a pro• to remove a public official from office

Rule 85

for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12 (1961).
Cited in National Adv Co. v Utah State Rd.
Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971);
Nelson v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162,
506 P.2d 437 (1973); RDG Associates/Jarman
Corp. v Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948
(Utah 1987); Bngham City v. Valencia, 779
P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
k

— 1 C.J.S. Actions § 39.
Numbers. — Action ®=» 25(1) to 25(4),

82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
this state or the venue of actions therein.
er*s Notes.
"JLC.P.

This rule is based on
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Young Law Review. — The Use
X2XA) Sanction to Establish In

Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
103.

Repealed.
Rule 83, authorizing rules by
•was repealed by order of the
effective May 1, 1991.

* Forms.
contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules
ded to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the
plate.
. — This rule is similar to
•it

ile.
may be known and cited as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
*U.R.C.P.
* This rule is similar to

Rule 4 3

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(e) Subsequent proceedings before Court of Appeals. Uiu
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the order of transfer and thai
upon the docket of the Court of Appeals, the case shall pr ,_
Court of Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other ap
pursuant to these rules.
(f) Finality of order of transfer. An order of transfer, when J
Clerk of the Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject to
only in the Supreme Court and only on jurisdictional grour
Advisory Committee Note. — Former
Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as
Rules 42 and 43 respectively and included in a
new title governing the certification and trans-

fer of cases between courts,
make uniform the practices folio
appellate courts m transferrin*!

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exhaustion of state remedies.
Status of Court of Appeals.
Exhaustion of state remedies.
Since the transfer process under this rule is
an overflow mechanism and not a review on
the merits as the exhaustion doctrine requires,
petitioner's original appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which was transferred to the
Utah Court of Appeals, did not exhaust his
state remedies. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758
(10th Cir. 1992).

Status of Court of Appeals,1* ^
When a case is transferred, thai
peals stands in the Supreme
all purposes pertinent to the caie^
bound by what the Supreme Court l l
done in the case merely because it?J
preme Court and the Court of An
other respects, a lower court.
Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 6 3 i |
App. 1987) (decided under former ]
Utah S. Ct.).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

Rule 43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to tn$
preme Court.
(a) Transfer. In any case over which the Court of Appeals has bi;
appellate jurisdiction, the court may, upon the affirmative vote of four jE
of the court, certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme Coiij
determination.
(b) Procedure for transfer.
(1) The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion, decide whether 1
should be certified. Any party to a case may, however, file and ser
original and eight copies of a suggestion for certification not exc
five pages setting forth the reasons why the party believes that they
should be certified. The suggestion may not be filed prior to the filii
docketing statement. Within ten days of service, an adverse party^
file and serve an original and eight copies of a statement not in exc
five pages either supporting or opposing the suggestion for certificate
(2) Upon entry of the order of certification, the Clerk of the Cou
Appeals shall immediately transfer the case, including the record and!
of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Court of App _
and a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and inch]
ing the certification order, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The CI
of the Court of Appeals shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk
the trial court that the case has been transferred.
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, the Clerk of the Suprefl
Court shall enter the appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court,
clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all par
and to the clerk of the trial court that the case has been docketed and t
all further filings will be made with the Clerk of the Supreme Court,
notice shall state the docket number assigned to the case in the Suprefl

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 44

Court. The case shall proceed before the Supreme Court to final decision
and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules.
(4) If the record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon completion of the conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If,
however, the record on appeal has already been transmitted to and filed
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of the entry of the
order of transfer, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall transmit the
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within five days of the
date of the entry of the order of transfer.
Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals shall consider certification
in the following cases:
N (1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that the case
r
hould be decided by the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court
ould probably grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if
"ded by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals
t rule, and
) Cases which will govern a number of other cases involving the same
issue or issues pending in the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit
~, or the Court of Appeals or which are cases of first impression
state or federal law which will have wide applicability.
•If

*8 Notes. — The Advisory Com**tovRule 42 also applies to this rule.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Review. — Recent Developments
^— The Utah Court of Appeals,
Rev. 150.

Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
i appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but is
"appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the
either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, shall
, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders,
e docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the
ijfthe transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to
teal court of the order transferring the case. The time for
L a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time
receiving court.
; Note. — Rule 4C is
**£$' ^ is amended to perappeal that is timely but
between the Supreme
JJ but also to the DisAdministrative Proce%0W has jurisdiction to
.ve proceedings of adoupreme Court and

x

NOTES TO DECISIONS

,Jite, 800 P.2d 825
•^Garcia, 805 P.2d

4

Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Provided that all parties have notice of the intent
to seek judicial review, the same policy considerations that permit: the transfer of an imprope r l y f l l e d a p p e a l between the Supreme Court
a n d t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a i s s h o uld permit the
t r a n s f e r o f s u c h a c a s e to the District Court,

199 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Padilla v. Utah Bd.
of Pardons, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).

Rule 22

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

not ipso facto entitle the defendant to be committed to the state hospital rather than the
state prison. Whether defendant is entitled to

psychiatric treatment as a i
factual issue. State v. Ande
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally 111
Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquittees, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 499.
A.L.R. — Pyromania and the criminal law,
51 A.L.R.4th 1243.
Probation revocation: insanity as defense, 56
A.L.R.4th 1178.
Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily

committed mentally m if^j
neuroleptic or antipsychotic C
of state constitutional guaranty^
1099.
- **>
Instructions in state i
defendant pleads insanity as tol
fmement in event of acquittalj
659.
^^

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment/^
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no"
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not le
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the coi:
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence!
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any infot
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence!
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
present any information material to the imposition of sentence^
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his ;
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to ;
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court: &
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the coi
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which \
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imp
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall-H
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defen
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with 1
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence impos
illegal manner, at any time.
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investigation, § 76-3-404.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E.

Suspending imposition of sentence i
ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Advising defendant of right to appeal.
Illegal sentence.
Jurisdiction.
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
—Indefinite suspension of sentence.
Sentencing hearing.
—Continued hearing.
—Evidence.
Delinquency record.
Polygraph examination.
Presentence report.
—Presence of counsel.
—Presence of defendant.
—Time.

Continuance for defendant.
Waiver.
Statements before sentencing.
—Defendant.
Cited.
Advising defendant of right to app
Trial court's failure to again advisej
dant of his right to appeal at sentencT
harmless error where trial court had i"
him of such right at the trial and
verdict, and he did not object to the tin
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 *J|
(Utah 1982).
Illegal sentence.
A district court may reassume jurisdid
correct an erroneous and void sentence
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spective of the time limits State v Lee Lim, 79
Utah 68, 7 P 2d 825 < 1932)
Jurisdiction.
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence
until the sentence has been corrected; however,
once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State
v. Montoya, 825 P 2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordinance, could not thereafter impose a jail sentence under those provisions of ordinance providing for cumulative punishment for a second
' or subsequent offense, without taking evidence
upon the question of the previous conviction
|Ex parte Mulhner, 101 Utah 51, 117 P 2d 819
1(1941).
-Indefinite suspension of sentence.
^The court, by indefinitely suspending senence, and permitting defendant to go on his
recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, so
it could not afterwards have him rear, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah
8, 71 P. 531, 95 Am St. R. 853 (1903)
atencing hearing.
ontinued hearing.
Failure to advise accused of nature of the
e, his plea and the verdict thereon at a
encmg proceeding which was a continuaga of a pnor sentence hearing was not revers• where defendant was adequately ap[ of that information m the initial prog, although it would have been preferar defendant to have been advised of those
the continued proceeding. State v.
don, 611 P 2d 728 (Utah 1980).
Hence.
glinquency record.
ord of delinquency is not admissible in
| t phase of a trial even though it is relet material to the issues, but the hmita• only to the use of the delinquency
, evidence" and is not a bar to considI the sentencing phase of a criminal
gfe v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah

Rule 22

the sentence pronounced with counsel present.
State v Neal. 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P 2d 756
(1953), cert, denied, 347 U S 963, 74 S Ct. 714,
98 L. Ed 1106 (1954)
—Presence of defendant.
Trial court had jurisdiction over defendant
for purposes of setting sentence although defendant, while released on his own recognizance, absented himself from the state, and
was sentenced only after having been found in
a federal correction institution in California
some seven months after his conviction, requirement that sentence be imposed within
two to len days after the \ erdict was directory
only, and might be extended for the convenience or at the request of the defendant. State
v Saxton. 30 Utah 2d 456, 519 P 2d 1340
1974)
Defendant was not required to be present at
hearing in which his probation was continued
State v. Jams, 597 P 2d 873 (Utah 1979)
—Time.
Time fixed by statute was not jurisdictional
Rose v District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486
(1926).
The time fixed by the statute was not jurisdictional and since it was regarded as merely
directory the further provision that a judgment
should be rendered within a reasonable time
has been judicially read into the statute State
v Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117. 262 P 2d 753 (1953)
Time limits are directory, not mandatory,
and trial court's failure to comply with them
does not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence; where sentence is imposed within a reasonable time so that the delay does not amount
to an abuse of the court's powers or adversely
affect the defendant, he is not entitled to go
free but only to have a correct sentence imposed, with due consideration given for any
time vserved because of the delay. State v.
Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977)/
Defendant who was convicted in March,
1975, placed on probation in October, 1976,
and had probation revoked and sentence imposed in September, 1978, was sentenced
within reasonable time. State v Jams, 597
P 2d 673 (Utah 1979).
Continuance for defendant.
Where there is a reasonable extension of
time for sentencing made at defendant's re*ph examination.
quest or with his consent or where extension
I court did not abuse its discretion in was calculated to be for defendant's possible
^consider at sentencing the results of benefit in determining whether he should be
h examination offered by the de- placed on probation, failure to impose sentence
1
claimed that the test was perti- within statutory time was not ground for deMttltimate question of his guilt, be- fendant's release. State v Helm, 563 P 2d 794
J of defendant's guilt was already (Utah 1977)
> and decided by the jury. State v
Waiver.
p d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing
nee report.
^or authors of a presentence re- judgment waived the right to object Rose v
quired to appear personally at a District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486 (1926).
tttenemg. State v. Anderson, 632 Statements before sentencing.
' 1981).
—Defendant
counsel.
Requirement that defendant be asked
Jttoe verdict as rendered the whether he has any cause why judgment
* Was mandatory, it would have should not be pronounced against him was subnormality to remand the case for stantially compiled with by question as to
^correcting error in not having whether he or his counsel had anything to
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may be necessary in appropnate cases to
a client of the organization that the
entation will not be affected by conflict-

Rule 7.1

ing loyalties of a member of the board Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances

CODE COMPARISON
j was no counterpart to this Rule in the

'e 6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests.
^lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization
Ived in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the
may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer
that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision
!
ch the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need
dentify the client.
COMMENT
involved m organizations seeking
orm generally do not have a chent-lawhonship with the organization Othermight follow that a lawyer could not be
" in a bar association law reform proat might indirectly affect a client For
>le9 a lawyer specializing m antitrust htimight be regarded as disqualified from
"ting m drafting revisions of rules govthat subject In determining the nature

and scope of participation in such activities, a
lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7
A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect
the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the orgamzation
when the lawyer knows a private client might
be materially benefitted.

CODE COMPARISON
no counterpart to this Rule in the

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES
.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Seri\ vices.
er shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
ading;
) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawCan achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
'Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless
comparison can be factually substantiated.
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Rule 7.2
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COMMENT
This Rule governs all communications about
a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used
to make known a lawyer's services, statements
about them should be truthful. The prohibition
in paragraph (b) of statements that may create
"unjustified expectations" would ordinarily
preclude advertisements about results ob-

tained on behalf of a client, such j
of a damage award or the lap
obtaining favorable verdicta,
ments containing client endor
information may create the
tation that similar results can be j
others without reference to the i
and legal circumstances.

CODE COMPARISON
DR 2-101 provided that "[a] lawyer shall not
. . . use . . . any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim." DR 2-10KB) provided that a lawyer
"may publish or broadcast . . . the following
information . . . in the geographic area or
areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information complies with DR 2-10KA), and is presented in a dignified manner . . . ." DR

2-10KB) then specified twenty-fivH
of information that may be dis
2-10KC) provided that "[a]ny i
to expand the information autho
closure in DR 2-10KB), or to
dissemination through other forumsi
to [the agency having jurisdiction t
law] . . . . The relief granted m*n
any such application shall be promu
an amendment to DR 2-10KB), uniy
plicable to all lawyers."
,>|j

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Association and Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation by Lawyers: How Can

States Protect Their Residents^
reaching and Deceptive Solicitatio
Utah L. Rev. 521.

Rule 7.2. Advertising.
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise i
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, ne
per or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television, or through writteB
munication not involving solicitation as defined in Rule 7.3.
^1
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication
be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record o£|
and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recorrime
the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable
advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and maj
the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other|
service organization.
H
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the J
of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
COMMENT
To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make
known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information
campaigns in the form of advertising. Adver-

tising involves an active quest for clients, <j
trary to the tradition that a lawyer «*houla
seek clientele. However, the PubhV* i*«
know about legal services can be
part through advertising. This need is J
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CHAPTER 13
ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
rules are promulgated pursuant to the integration of the Utah State
the Supreme Court on June 30, 1981 in In re Integration and Goverof the Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845 (1981), and Article VIII Section 4 of
"tah Constitution, amended effective July 1, 1985.

EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1988
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN
CLIENTS,
RULE

4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others.
4.2. Communication with Person Represented
by Counsel.
4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Person.
4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons.

ENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP.

ctence.
of Representation.
nee.
unication.

LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS.

"dentiality of Information.
*ct of Interest: General Rule.
'ct of Interest: Prohibited Transac*ons.
*ct of Interest: Former Client.
$uted Disqualification: General Rule,
sive Government and Private Em"oyment.
aer Judge or Arbitrator.
keeping Property.
~ning or Terminating Representan.
COUNSELOR.

5.1. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer.
5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer.
5.3. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.
5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer.
5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law.
5.6. Restrictions on Right to Practice.
PUBLIC SERVICE.

6.1. Pro Bono Publico Service.
6.2. Accepting Appointments.
6.3. Membership in Legal Services Organization.
6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client
Interests.
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES.

Liary.
txation for Use by Third Persons.
~. ADVOCATE.

*ou8 Claims and Contentions,
/.ting Litigation.
"'Toward the Tribunal.
to Opposing Party and Counsel,
lity and Decorum of the Tribunal.
..Publicity.
• as Witness.
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,
te in Nonadjudicative Proceedings.

7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's
Services.
"' """
7.2. Advertising.
7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.
7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice.
7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads.
MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PROFESSION.

8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
8.4.
8.5.

Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.
Judicial Officials.
Reporting Professional Misconduct.
Misconduct.
Jurisdiction.

GAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
er is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
an having special responsibility for the quality of justice,
resentative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advier provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's
and obligations and explains their practical implications. As adwyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
^consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As
between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent in^an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each
955
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client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's le
reporting about them to the client or to others. A lawyer's ret
client, including representation by appointment, does not coiL
dorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral vie
ties.
In all professional functions, a lawyer should be competent
diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a cliei
the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence informat
to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required i
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the!
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and
fairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimat
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demor
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, o i _
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, tol
the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold!
cess.
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the
ministration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the lee
sion. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivat
edge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in i
the law and work to strengthen legal education A lawyer should \
of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that
and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate leg
tance and should therefore devote professional time and civic ii
their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing 1
tives and should help the Bar regulate itself in the public intere
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in
of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. HOY
a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of j
sional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of si
improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal pr
sion's ideal of public service.
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus,
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate|
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being doi
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily i
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice,
thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communicatio
will be private.
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are <
countered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict betwe
a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactoi;
living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving sue
conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, many difficult issues of
sional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercii
of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principle
underlying the Rules.
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions
also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession i»"j
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession ;
and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is"
manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is
vested largely in the courts.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

fo the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling,
be occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps
intain the legal profession's independence from government domination.
„ independent legal profession is an important force in preserving governed under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a
ofession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to
^actice.
[The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilii of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
illations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of
__chial or self-interested concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible
»observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid
^securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibili: compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest
iich it serves.
awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of
role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our
[ system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve
Idefine that relationship.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Law Review. — Professional StanVersus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's
1989 Utah L. Rev. 1.

SCOPE
he Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interwith reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall
% These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline,
s, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas
|r the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinIction should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within
ads of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships
pen the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and
plinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawprofessional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comedo not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing
apliance with the Rules.
jjlules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That
[ includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws
ag specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, de^primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily
einforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary,
inforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, how*iaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a law/ao worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal
"he Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.
ermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and reality, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine
K a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from
'"it-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested that
Y$t render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there
^duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may
JJ«en the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relational be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any
ipurpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Under various legal provisions, including constitution
mon law, the responsibilities of government lawyers
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the clii
lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a gove
have authority on behalf of the government to decide"
whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authoS
spects is generally vested in the attorney general and thel
state government, and their federal counterparts, and the L__
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the sun
officers may be authorized to represent several government i
governmental legal controversies in circumstances where
could not represent multiple private clients. They also may 1__
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a privat
not be authorized to do so. These Rules do not abrogate any s
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed j
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presupp
plinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the ba
and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in*
in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon3
incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules pr
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation and 1
a sanction depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulne
ousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether therefi
previous violations. Disciplinary action shall be governed by the ]
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be'oiS^
Bar to sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincing1^
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, nor^j
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The'.
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure fori
ing conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to beS
for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be sul
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons,
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanction
lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority does not;"
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has stand
seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extran
plinary consequences of violating such a duty.
£
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial appli
tion of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege. Those privile
were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation?!
reliance on the client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to exoect th
communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected again
compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer privilege is that of the client and n<S
of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the
Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate?
the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expecta-J
tion that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed*
and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in,
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and work prod-?
uct privileges.
*;
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule
1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination
would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with
law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure.
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.1

neral orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation,
the text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to
apare counterparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility (approved by
Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected referes to other authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not constitute
; of the Rules and are not intended to affect the application or mterpretaof the Rules and Comments.

TERMINOLOGY
3elief' or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed
| fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumaces.
Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reason|y sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter
"question.
"" i" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers
in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and
yers employed in a legal services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
raud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and
nerely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of rele*information.
aowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
ion. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
tner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law
^organized as a professional corporation.
sonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer,
the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer,
aisonable belief' or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a
• denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
stances are such that the belief is reasonable.
[>nably should know," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that
per of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter
stion.
stantial," when used in reference to degree or extent, denotes a mateof clear and weighty importance.

Client-Lawyer Relationship
•1. Competence.
per shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
atation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and prepaeasonably necessary for the representation.
COMMENT
training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is
lining whether a lawyer employs
ttte knowledge and skill m a particu- unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as
f# relevant factors include the rela- competent as a practitioner with long experiity and specialized nature of the ence. Some important legal skills, such as the
••lawyer's general experience, the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evi""lining and experience in the field in dence and legal drafting, are required m all
©preparation and study the lawyer legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental
[five the matter and whether it is legal skill consists of determining what kind of
•fer the matter to, or associate or legal problems a situation may involve, a skill
a lawyer of established compe- that necessarily transcends any particular spefieid in question. In many m- cialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adeL
required proficiency is that of a quate representation in a wholly novel field
^tioner. Expertise in a particular through necessary study. Competent represen*y be required in some circum- tation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in
not necessarily have special the field in question.
fgal Knowledge and Skill

34.

Approved:

December 30# 1976

Summary:
It is improper for lawyers to hold themselves out as
partners where no partnership relationship exists,
A lawyer may not do what his partner, associate or one he shares
office space with may not doAn attorney may not appear before a pro-tem judge with whom
office space is shared and may not appear in any criminal matters in
that court.
Pacts:

Three

attorneys

share

office

space

under

an office

sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm name with a single
telephone number and address, and with the names of each of the three
along the left margin of your letterhead.

You describe the relation-

ship as "an office sharing partnership."
Numbered among the three is a deputy county attorney who does
criminal prosecutions and practices privately, and an attorney who
sits periodically as municipal pro-tern judge.
The questions you have posed are:
1.

Are

the other

two attorneys

in the office precluded

from

doing criminal work entirely, just as to state prosecutions, just as
to matters the deputy county attorney may be involved in, or not at
all?
2.

What, if any, limitation should be placed on the attorney

serving as a municipal pro tern judge, and what, if any, restrictions
should there be as to his associates appearing before him as a pro tern
judge or appearing before that court?

44

Your inquiries raise some important preliminary questions which
must

necessarily

be explored

prior

to responding

to the

specific

questions you have asked•
You have indicated in your background information that each of
you receives income only from your own clients and not from the work
of any other attorney in the office*
Opinion:

Rule IV, Canon 2, DR 2-102 (C) of the Utah Rules of

Professional Conduct indicates;
"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in
fact partners.*
The relationship you have delineated

in your letter which you

describe as "an office sharing partnership" is not in fact a partnership but merely

an office

sharing

arrangement•

In this

regard,

several ABA Ethics Opinions are pertinent.
Formal

Opinion

106

cited

with

approval

in the ABA

Code

of

Professional Responsibility under DR 2-102(C) passed directly on the
relationship, holding that it was improper for a group of attorneys to
hold themselves out as partners where no partnership existed but one
was the employer of the others named in the firm name.
Formal Opinion 115 held that two attorneys could not hold themselves out as partners when they were, in fact, attorneys in separate
states using a partnership name in both states and where each was
responsible for his own office expenses.
Formal Opinion 126 held that it was improper for lawyers sharing
office space to hold themselves out as partners under the name A, B
and C for the purpose of court appearances and signing pleadings when
in fact they were not partners.

Ay*

Formal Opinion 277 held that it was improper for two attorneys in
different cities to hold themselves out as partners under the name of
Smith and Jonesf Attorneys at Law, when in fact what they had was a
referral arrangement only.
In Informal Decision

555 , the question was asked

whether

two

attorneys might practice under a firm name where no real partnership
in

fact

exists

expenses.

and

when

they

are

in

reality

associates

sharing

The Committee stated unequivocally:

"This Committee has stated on numerous occasions that
it is improper for a group of lawyers to hold themselves out
as partners when no partnership relation in fact exists*"
(citing the cases enumerated above)
We think
rethink

your

it is incumbent
relationship,

upon

since

the three of you

it

appears

likely

to carefully
that

you

are

currently at cross purposes with DR 2-102(P).
A determination of partnership status is not, however material to
the questions you have raised, i.e., the interrelation of you as associates, having regard to the county prosecutor duties of one associate
and pro-tern judge status of the other.

If you were truly partners,

you would fall under the interdiction "that which one partner could
not do precludes all partners from undertaking to do."

(ABA Formal

Opinion 177, Informal Decisions C-493, 674, 691 and 855.)
The question then is, are persons sharing an office relationship
in a different position than those who are partners or associates of a
partnership?

Informal Opinion

opinion holds that:

855 holds

that they are not.

The

"• . . what a laywer cannot do, neither his partner,
his associate nor one with whom he shares offices may do,"
This view is reinforced in Informal Opinion 995 where it is held
cnat two lawyers who share offices, although not partners, bear such a
close relation to one another that if one is precluded ethically from
representing a client then so also is the other.
With
specifics.

these

principles

as

guidelines,

let

us

examine

the

This Committee has held in Utah Opinion 26 that a pro-tern

judge may not appear as criminal defense counsel in the same court,
statings
"Working with criminal court personnel and police, in
the close circumstances required in the judicial handling of
criminal matters, has an effect upon those persons which
would make it difficult for a police officer, for example,
to regard a pro-tem judge, acting as counsel, as he would
any other lawyer ^contending adversely to the case he is presenting to the court.
We think the appearance of impropriety and the potential for pressure on police personnel makes it inappropriate
for an attorney serving as a pro-tern judge in city court
criminal cases, on a not infrequent basis to also act as
defense counsel in city court criminal cases."
The Committee has also held in Utah Opinion 22 that county attorneys may not represent criminal defendants in other courts.
same effect is Utah Opinion 16.
a deputy.

To the

This interdiction applies equally

td

(Utah Opinions 4 and 7.)

Neither of the remaining two could properly appear before the
pro-tern judge since he obviously could not do so.
appear

None of you may

in municipal court criminal matters since the pro-tem judge

would be precluded.

None of you could properly appear as counsel iri

any civil matter arising out of a criminal matter in which either the
pro-tern judge or the deputy county prosecutor had involvement*.

It follows, of course^

that neither of the remaining

two may

represent the other side in civil litigation where one of you represents a party to the litigation.

BY
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-16 00
Attorney for Defendant
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31
P.O. Box 1425

€©PY

S t . George, Utah 84770
Tel:
(801) 6 2 8 - 2 8 4 6

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
>
;1

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING ATTORNEYS
FEES

vs.
SONJA SWANSON,
i

Defendant.
gssag=ss=5BEassgs53==3===g=sss=s=sa.

niaBsaassss

i

Criminal No.
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931500042
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'i

'

• a

The matter, having come before the Court on defendant's motion
and heard on March 12, 1993, in open court at the Washington County
Courthouse, St. George, Utah, defendant having been represented by
her attorney of record, R. Clayton Huntsman, and the State of Utah
by Washington County Attorney, Eric Ludlow, and the matter having
been submitted,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that defendant's request for

1

attorneys fees in this action be and therefore is DENIED.
Dated this JC2=L

day of March, 1993.

WE
¥ct Cetar;t Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

MAIL-ING^^ j ,

-.

I do hereby certify that on the //
day
March^ig^ar, I mailed
a true and accurate unsigned copy of the abo^ - W ^ o ^ e g o i n g ORDER
DENYING ATTORNEYS FEES by placing same in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:
Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

^

R. cflayton/ Huntsman
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the 33 —dav of March, 1993, I
mailed a true and accurate signed copy of the above and foregoing
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEYS FEES by placing same in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:
Eric Ludlow
Washington County
Attorney
178 North 200 East
S t . George, Utah 84770

4&*:
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-1600
Attorney for Defendant
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Tower Building - S u i t e 31
P.O. Box 1425
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-2846

Sttev

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
;)
|

vs.

;

ORDER FOR FINDING OF
INDIGENCY AND FOR
TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER COSTS

SONJA SWANSON,
Defendant.

Criminal No.

931500042

Based upon its record on Friday, March 5, 1993, and upon the
motion of defendant herein, upon applicable state and federal law
including but not

limited to U.C.A.

§77-32-1 et. sea., and

particularly under U.C.A, §77-32-5, and other good cause appearing,
it is found, concluded and ordered that:
1. Defendant herein is indigent and was provided the services
of a WAshington County Public Defender through her sentencing.
2.
felony

Defendant, being indigent and having been convicted of a
in this

Court,

is entitled

to

a transcript

of all

proceedings on her case to be paid by Washington County, State of
1

Utah, as well as costs of the first right of appeal, including
appeal of the Certificate of Probable Cause if necessary.
3.

Washington County is ordered to pay the costs of this

transcript.
Dated this

-A

day of March, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE HAND DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that on the ^yth day of March,
delivered a true and accurate unsigned copy of the above and
foregoing ORDER FINDING OF INDIGENCY AND FOR TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER
COSTS to the following, to wit:
Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

R.' CTTaytcKfi 'Hun-gsma/h
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

A£
I do hereby certify that on the \ Q
day of March, 1993, I
mailed a true and accurate signed copy of the above and foregoing
ORDER FINDING OF INDIGENCY AND FOR TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER COSTS by
placing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following, to wit:
Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East

2

St, George, Utah 84770
Secretary

3
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